The Third Circuit Splits the Felon Gun Ban: What Bost and Williams Mean for Old Convictions

This article reflects the court opinions, federal rules, and dockets as of October 2026. These cases may be appealed and the law will keep changing. Check the current status before relying on anything here. This is general information, not legal advice.

On October 13, 2026, the full U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit decided two challenges to the federal ban on gun possession by people with felony-level convictions. It upheld the ban in one case and struck it down as applied to one man in the other.

That sounds contradictory, but the two rulings fit together. Read side by side, they answer a question working through the courts since 2022: when can the government permanently disarm someone because of an old conviction?

One point up front: neither decision restores anyone's gun rights except Edward Williams's, and it would be a serious mistake to read these opinions as permission to buy or possess a firearm.

The law being challenged

The statute is 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). It makes it a federal crime for anyone "convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year" to possess a firearm or ammunition. Three features of that wording matter for these cases.

• It turns on the maximum possible sentence, not the actual sentence. Someone who served 90 days can be covered.
• The label "felony" does not control. State misdemeanors are excluded only if they carry a maximum of two years or less, under 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20)(B). Both men in these cases had Pennsylvania misdemeanor convictions that carried up to five years, so the federal ban reached them.
• The ban has no end date. Unless a conviction is expunged, set aside, or pardoned, or the person's civil rights are restored, the prohibition lasts for life.

The backdrop: Bruen, Range, and Rahimi

In New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n v. Bruen (2022), the Supreme Court held that when the Second Amendment's text covers someone's conduct, the government has to justify its regulation by showing it fits the nation's historical tradition of firearm regulation. Our explainer on the Second Amendment after Bruen walks through how that test works.

The Third Circuit has been applying Bruen to § 922(g)(1) for years through the case of Bryan Range, a Pennsylvania man with a decades-old conviction for food-stamp fraud.

• Range I. In 2023, the full court held the ban unconstitutional as applied to Range.
• Supreme Court remand. On July 2, 2024, the Supreme Court vacated that judgment and sent the case back for reconsideration in light of United States v. Rahimi, according to the Supreme Court's docket in Garland v. Range.
• Range II. Later in 2024, the full Third Circuit reached the same result again (124 F.4th 218). It held that people with felony convictions are part of "the people" the Second Amendment protects, and that the government had not shown a historical tradition of permanently disarming someone like Range.

Range II left open how courts should decide which people the ban can constitutionally reach. Bost and Williams answer that.

United States v. Bost: a threats conviction is enough

James Bost's case came up as a criminal prosecution. According to the court's opinion, Bost carjacked a woman in 2002, threatened to kill her unless she gave him money, and pleaded guilty to terroristic threats, conspiracy, false imprisonment, and simple assault. The terroristic-threats and conspiracy convictions were first-degree misdemeanors under Pennsylvania law, punishable by up to five years. Years later, U.S. Marshals found him next to a stolen .38 caliber pistol, and he was charged under § 922(g)(1). He moved to dismiss, arguing the ban was unconstitutional on its face and as applied to him.

Judge Bibas wrote for the court, which affirmed his conviction. The core holding is this:

"We hold that some predicate crimes (like Bost's conviction for terroristic threats) demonstrate a prima facie risk of physical violence from misusing guns and that those convicted of such crimes may presumptively be disarmed based on those convictions alone."

The court concluded that, at the founding, disarmament usually followed a judge's individualized finding that a person posed a risk of physical violence, as with the going-armed and surety laws the Supreme Court relied on in Rahimi. A conviction can supply that finding, but only when the crime itself signals such a risk.

That led to a framework with two clear ends and a possible middle:

• Violent or threatening crimes justify disarmament. The opinion names common-law murder, forcible rape, and common-law robbery as examples, along with threatening conduct. The crime does not have to have involved a gun.
• Crimes that are not even physically dangerous do not. The court pointed back to Range's food-stamp fraud.
• There may be a middle category. Some crimes "may fuel" violence without involving it directly. Whether those justify disarmament depends on their own historical analogues, and the court said it did not need to draw those lines yet.

Bost's conviction required "a threat to commit any crime of violence with intent to terrorize another." That placed him at the violent end, so his challenge failed. The court also rejected his facial challenge: a law that can be validly applied to the challenger is not facially invalid.

Two smaller points from Bost matter going forward:

• Pitsilides is out. The court said an earlier panel decision, Pitsilides v. Barr, "is no longer our touchstone."
• No exhaustion requirement. Bost did not have to apply for administrative relief before raising the Second Amendment as a defense to criminal charges.

The vote. Twelve of the fourteen judges agreed Bost's conviction should stand, though not all for the same reasons. Judge Phipps dissented, joined by Judge Bove. He argued there is no historical analogue for the "presumptive permanent disarmament" that § 922(g)(1) imposes.

At the other end of the court, Judge Shwartz, joined by Judges Krause and Restrepo, agreed with the result but not the test. In her view, § 922(g)(1) constitutionally applies to all felons. A footnote in her concurrence lists the Second, Fourth, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits as courts that have rejected a danger-based limit on the ban.

Williams v. Attorney General: two old DUIs are not enough

Edward Williams's case came up differently. He was not charged with anything. He sued in 2017, asking a court to declare that § 922(g)(1) could not constitutionally be applied to him.

According to the court's opinion:

• The first offense. In 2000, Williams was charged with DUI and entered Pennsylvania's Accelerated Rehabilitative Disposition program.
• The second offense. In 2005, he was convicted of DUI at the "highest rate of alcohol" (a blood alcohol concentration of 0.16% or higher). Because it was a second offense, it was punishable by up to five years.
• The sentence. He received 90 days to two years and served it in home confinement.
• What happened next. He kept owning guns and worked at a gun store. In 2015, his lawyer told him the 2005 conviction prohibited him from possessing firearms, and he got rid of all of them.

Judge Matey wrote for the 8–6 majority, which affirmed the district court's judgment for Williams. The method follows Bost. The court looks at the elements of the predicate offense and, where needed, the limited court records the Supreme Court approved in Shepard v. United States (the charging document, plea agreement, plea colloquy, and similar records). If the offense "lacks threats or violence, then the predicate crime was likely never disarmable."

Williams's offense required driving, a blood alcohol level of 0.16% or higher, and a prior DUI. The court said it "plainly does not contain threatening or violent elements." The government's historical analogy to laws about "habitual drunkards" failed. The court relied partly on the Supreme Court's 2026 decision in United States v. Hemani (covered in our post on marijuana users and gun ownership), which described those laws as protecting drunkards and their families rather than protecting the public from violence. The court also noted that the record showed Williams had done nothing violent in more than twenty years.

The vote. Chief Judge Chagares joined the judgment for Williams but wrote separately. In his view, people seeking to restore their rights should generally go through the federal administrative process first, though he would excuse Williams given how long his case has been pending. Six judges would have ruled against Williams:

• Judge Freeman, joined by Judges Montgomery-Reeves and Chung, agreed with looking at the elements of the conviction. She would not limit disarming convictions to those involving violence or threats.
• Judge Shwartz, joined by Judges Krause and Restrepo, would have upheld the ban as applied to Williams. She would also have dismissed his case so he could apply for administrative relief first.

How the two cases fit together

Read together, the rulings set up a sorting exercise for § 922(g)(1) cases in the Third Circuit:

• Start with the elements of the prior conviction, plus the limited Shepard records where needed.
• Violence or threats in the elements: the ban applies, at least at the early stage of a case.
• Neither: as with Range's fraud or Williams's DUI, the government needs a different historical analogy, and here it had none.
• Crimes in between: left for future cases.

Who is bound, and what this does not do

Geography. The Third Circuit covers Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Delaware, and the U.S. Virgin Islands, under 28 U.S.C. § 41. Its decisions bind the federal courts in those places. They do not bind federal courts elsewhere, and other circuits have taken different approaches, as Judge Shwartz's footnote shows.

Williams is an as-applied ruling for one person. The court affirmed a declaratory judgment for Edward Williams based on his specific conviction and record. It did not strike down § 922(g)(1). It did not hold that everyone with a DUI conviction may have guns. It did not order the FBI's background check system to clear anyone else.

The ban stays on the books and stays enforceable. A person with a qualifying conviction who buys or possesses a firearm on the strength of these opinions is risking a federal felony prosecution. Whether a defense under Bost and Williams would work in that case would turn on the conviction, the court, and the stage of the case. State law can also prohibit possession independently of federal law, so a federal ruling does not settle state-law eligibility.

Consider a New Jersey resident with a 20-year-old nonviolent conviction that carried a possible sentence of more than a year. After Bost and Williams, that person may have a stronger argument than before. But a background check at the dealer's counter is still likely to come back denied, because neither opinion changes how the federal background check system treats that record. The safe paths run through a court, the administrative process, or a pardon or expungement, with a lawyer's help.

The federal restoration process is back

Both opinions spend time on 18 U.S.C. § 925(c). That provision lets the Attorney General grant relief from federal firearms disabilities to someone who shows they are not likely to act in a manner dangerous to public safety. Congress blocked funding for it for decades.

The Justice Department has now revived it. Its final rule, "Application for Relief From Disabilities Imposed by Federal Laws With Respect to the Acquisition, Receipt, Transfer, Shipment, Transportation, or Possession of Firearms," was published in the Federal Register on August 20, 2026 (91 FR 54054). According to the rule, it took effect September 21, 2026, and the Department began soliciting applications from individuals on that date.

Judge Shwartz and Chief Judge Chagares see it as the main path to restoration. The Williams majority called relief before the final rule "a slow trickle" and declined to make Williams wait for it. Our guide to the federal firearms rights restoration program covers how to apply.

What could happen next

Both cases were decided by the full court, so the next step for a losing side is a Supreme Court petition. The Justice Department could seek review in Williams, and Bost could seek review of his conviction. As of October 24, 2026, those are possibilities, not filed petitions.

The Supreme Court has repeatedly described felon-possession bans as "longstanding" and presumptively lawful, as Judge Shwartz's concurrence points out, citing Heller, McDonald, and Rahimi. It has not decided how as-applied challenges to § 922(g)(1) should be resolved. With the circuits divided on whether dangerousness is the line, the question may reach the Court eventually, but no one can say when.

What to watch

• Cert petitions in Bost or Williams. A petition would receive a new Supreme Court docket number, so search the Supreme Court docket by case name.
• Third Circuit cases about the middle category of crimes that are not violent by their elements but may be treated as risk-creating.
• How the § 925(c) program operates in practice, including how many applications are granted and how long decisions take.

We will update this article if either case reaches the Supreme Court.

Looking for a licensed dealer near you? Browse our dealer directory to find dealers by location.